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Abstract 
This paper (1) shows that the best supported 
current psychological theory (Cheng, 1997) of 
how human subjects judge the causal power or 
influence of variations in presence or absence 
of one feature on another, given data on their 
covariation, tacitly uses a Bayes network 
which is either a noisy or gate (for causes that 
promote the effect) or a noisy and gate (for 
causes that inhibit the effect); (2) generalizes 
Cheng's theory to arbitrary acyclic networks of 
noisy or and noisy and gates; (3) gives various 
sufficient conditions for the estimation of the 
parameters in such networks when there are 
independent, unobserved causes; (4) 
distinguishes direct causal influence of one 
feature on another (influence along a path with 
one edge) from total influence (influence along 
all paths from one variable to another) and 
gives sufficient conditions for estimating each 
when there are unobserved causes of the 
outcome variable; (5) describes the relation 
between Cheng models and a simplified 
version of the "Rubin" framework for 
representing causal relations. 
I. Cheng's Model of Human Judgement 
ofCausal Power. 
Consider variables, A, B, C, D, E, etc., each taking 
values 1 (present) or 0 (absent). Given data on the 
joint frequency of candidate causes (of effect E) 
and of E, when unobserved causes of E may also 
be acting, how do people judge the efficacy or 
causal power of any particular observed candidate 
cause? Cheng (1997) proposes that, according to 
context, people have implicit models of the causal 
relations among the variables, and in appropriate 
circumstances their judgements of causal power 
are at least qualitatively correct in view of those 
models. Cheng's theory postulates that the human 
model of facilitating causes-those which increase 
the probability of the effect-is distinct from the 
human model of preventive causes-those which 
decrease the probability of the effect. She deals 
explicitly with two cases. 
Case 1: All unobserved causes of E are 
facilitating, and one or more facilitating candidate 
causes of E are observed along with E. For the 
simplest case in which C is the only observed 
facilitating candidate cause and U is an 
unobserved facilitating cause she proposes: 
(1) Pr(E = 1) = Pr(q8,cC = 1) + Pr(qe,uU = 1) -
Pr(qe,c Qe,uCU = 1) . 
The q parameters are assumed to be independent 
of each other and of the variables. It follows that 
(2) Pr(E = 1 I C = 1, U = 0) = Pr(Qe,c = 1). 
which justifies describing Pr(Qe.c = 1) as the 
"causal power'' of C to produce E. Cheng shows 
that when C, U are independent: 
(3) Pr(Qe,c = 1).= [Pr(E =1 I C =1)- Pr(E = 1 I C = 
0)] I [1 - Pr(E =1 1 C = 0)] 
So that the causal power of C to produce E can be 
estimated without observing U. Hereafter the 
numerator in the r.h.s. of (3) will be denoted by 
aPe. 
When two or more independent facilitating causes 
are observed the causal power of any one of 
them, say C, can be obtained by applying the 
same formulas (1), (2), (3). When two or more 
correlated candidate facilitating causes, say C and 
0, are observed, Cheng obtains the causal power 
of any one of them, say C, by using conditional 
probabilities (on 0 = 0) in (1), (2) and (3). 
Case 2: All unobserved causes U of E are 
facilitating, and there is an observed candidate 
preventing cause F of E. Cheng's equation is: 
(4) Pr( E = 1) = Pr(qe,u U = 1) • Pr(1 -qe,f F = 1). 
Assuming independence of U and F she shows 
that 
(5) Pr(qe,t = 1) =-APt I Pr(E I F = 0) 
(5) shows that the parameter Pr(qe.t =1) can be 
estimated from observations ofF, E alone, even in 
the presence of other unrecorded facilitating 
causes of E, so long as they are independent of F. 
Cheng proposes that when, in such 
circumstances, subjects report their estimates of 
the power ofF to prevent E, they are reporting an 
estimate of Pr(qe,t=1). Her account of judgements 
of facilitating and preventing causes is justified by 
an extensive review of the literature in 
experimental psychology on human judgement of 
causal power. 
II. Issues about Cheng's Theory 
Several questions naturally arise about 
implications of the model: (1) What happens if, as 
in cases 1 and 2, the unobserved causes are 
facilitating, but the observed causes include both 
facilitating and preventing causes? Can the causal 
powers of both be estimated? (2) What if all 
observed causes are preventing, but more than 
one is observed? (3) What if some or all of the 
unobserved causes are preventing? (4) What if a 
cause, whether facilitating or preventing, only 
influences the effect indirectly, through intervening 
observed causes, either facilitating or preventing? 
(5) What if there are multiple pathways, some 
through observed intervening causes, from a 
cause to the effect? (6) What if a preventing 
causes interferes with some facilitating causes but 
not others? (7) What if a cause prevents some 
effects and facilitates others? (8) Or consider a 
case like 1, but with two facilitating observed 
correlated candidate causes, C and 0, for which 0 
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is the unique facilitating cause of C. To determine 
the causal power of C by the method described, 
probabilities must be estimated conditional on C = 
1 and 0 = 0, which is inconsistent with the model. 
Can the causal power of C nonetheless be 
estimated in some other way in such cases? (9) 
Instead of estimating the probability that a factor C 
causes E given that C occurs, can we estimate the 
probability that C caused E, given that C and E 
both occur? The last question is of enormous 
practical importance in scientific and legal 
contexts. (10) Can the model be used to forecast 
the frequency of the effect if an intervention 
removed (or prevented) the cause in all units? 
(11) And, not least, how if at all is Cheng's model 
related to graphical causal models of the sort 
widely used in the social sciences and advocated 
by Spirtes, et al., 1993 and by Peart, 1995, and to 
the representation of causation now widely used in 
statistics advocated by Rubin, Holland (1985) and 
others? 
Complete or partial answers to all of these 
questions about Cheng models can be found by 
recognizing them as particular parameterizations 
of Bayes nets. The arguments require only 
algebra and some well known ideas about 
directed graphical models; proofs will not be given 
here, but they are all straightforward. An 
interesting, and in view of Cheng's empirical 
results perhaps not accidental, historical fact is 
that directed graphical models seem first to have 
been applied in computer science because they 
facilitated elicitation of expert judgements for use 
in probabilistic expert systems. While I hope the 
results that follow are interesting in themselves, 
they illustrate the wonderful power of directed 
graphical formulations to extract implications from 
other representations. 
Ill. The Quickest Review of Bayes Nets 
with a Causal Interpretation. 
Where C, 0, E etc. are causally related represent 
their causal relations by drawing appropriate 
directed edges among the variables, for example: · 
c c 0 
E" 
ii 
When drawing such graphs, a preventing 
influence will be written as a boldface directed 
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arrow; unobserved variables will be written inside 
rectangles. 
Let G be a directed acyclic graph (hereafter DAG; 
acyclic means no directed paths (see below) from 
a vertex back to itself) and let Pr be a probability 
distribution defined on a set S of vectors of values 
of the variables represented by vertices in G. Then 
we say Pr is Markov for G, S if, for all vectors X of 
values in S, Pr(X) equals the product, over all 
variables, of the probability (by Pr) of the value of 
each variable conditional on the values of its 
parents. Any such decomposition for values of 
variables represented by vertices in a DAG will be 
called a Markov factorization of Pr. When I write 
equations in terms of variables, as in Pr(C,D,E) = 
Pr(E 1 C,D) Pr(C) Pr(D) I mean the analogous 
equation holds for all permissible values of the 
variables. 
The indegree of a vertex is the number of edges 
directed into it. A directed path from vertex C to 
vertex E in a DAG is a sequence of vertices whose 
first member is C and whose last is E such that 
every member in the sequence has an edge 
directed into it from the vertex immediately 
preceding it in the sequence. 
Let v be a value for a variable V represented by a 
vertex V in a DAG G, with admissible value set S, 
and associated Markov probability distribution Pr. 
A V(v) intervention is a graph G(V=v) obtained 
from G by removing all edges directed into V, and 
an admissible value set S* obtained from S by 
replacing with v any occurrence of a value v'_ v of 
V in a member of S, and a probability distribution 
Pr* obtained by replacing, in each Markov 
factorization of Pr, all factors of the form Pr(V = v' 1 
__) by 1, and all factors of the form Pr (V = v' 1 
__) by zero if v' -:�: v, and by replacing Pr( _ 1 V 
= v') by Pr( _ 1 V = v) if defined, and if not defined 
then by some new distribution Pr*( _IV = v). An 
example, illustrating the need for this complexity, 
will be given in section V. 
IV. Answering Half of Question 11: 
Cheng Models are Noisy Or and Noisy 
And Gates, and so Causal Bayes Nets 
Equation 1 can be obtained by taking probabilities 
on both sides of a deterministic equation relating 
Boolean variables, and using Cheng's assumption 
that the q parameters are independently 
distributed. 
where "++" denotes Boolean addition. Probabilities 
based on this equation, the independence of the 
parameters, and the further independence of C 
and U are noisy or gates (Pearl, 1988). They can 
be represent by a particular parameterization of 
probability distributions Markov for a DAG, 
implying the independence of C and U. Adding 
additional sums to equation (6) and taking 
probabilities, the number of independent 
facilitating causes can be increased arbitrarily. 
Equation 5 can similarly be obtained by taking 
probabilities in the equation 
(7) E = qe,cC • (1 - qe,f F) 
With C and F independent, this represents a noisy 
and gate. Clearly any composition of facilitating 
and preventing causes can be represented by a 
system of such equations. 
For any DAG, G, with edges labeled as facilitating 
or preventive, and, if necessary, preventive edges 
labeled for the facilitating edges they collide with 
and interfere with, there is a corresponding set of 
Boolean equations. Let S be the set of values of 
variables consistent with the equations. Let Pr be 
positive on S, and Markov for G . I will call any 
such structure, < G, S, Pr>, such that every vertex 
of positive indegree has at least one facilitating 
cause, a Cheng model. (Variables whose only 
causes are preventing are fixed at zero and so 
such structures will be ignored.) 
V. Answering Question 
Models with Interventions 
For equations and DAG 
(8) E = qe,c C + qe,d D 
(9) D = qd,c C 
C ) D 
� E ,/ 
8: Cheng 
Pr(qe,d) cannot be computed from Pr(C,D,E). A 
computation using equation (3) with probabilities 
conditional on C = 0 would require Pr(E I C = O,D 
= 1), which is undefined, since D must vanish 
when C does. Pr(qe,d) can, however, be calculated 
from the (1 ,0) intervention in the structure just 
given. That intervention yields 
c��o 
E 
and the equation 
(10} E = qe,c C + qe,d 
and the new probability distribution Pr*(C = 0,0 = 
1,E) = Pr*(E I 0 = 1, C = O)Pr(C = 0); Pr*(C = 1, 0 
= 1, E) = Pr(E 1 0 = 1, C = 1)Pr(C = 1). (The 
equations resulting from a (v,V) intervention can 
always be obtained by substituting v for V in any 
equation in which V occurs on the r.h.s. and 
eliminating the equation in which V occurs on the 
l.h.s. See Pearl (1995)). 
Pr*(qe,d) can now be immediately calculated by 
setting C = 0 in (10) and taking Pr* of both sides. 
Assuming Pr(qe,d) = Pr*(qe,d). the original causal 
power can be estimated. 
The hypothesis that in appropriate situations 
people implicitly use Cheng models in judging 
causal power thus implies that given frequency 
data on two facilitating causes and their effect, 
when the value of one of the facilitating causes is 
uniquely determined by the other, subjects should 
be uncertain as to the causal power of the 
determined facilitating cause, but that uncertainty 
should be reduced if they are afforded the 
opportunity to intervene and manipulate the values 
of the determined facilitating cause. 
VI. Answering Questions 2 and 3 and 
(Part of) 6: Preventing Causes 
Cheng's equation (5) shows that the causal power 
of a preventing cause can be estimated when 
there is an independent unobserved facilitating 
cause. The derivation can be generalized to any 
number of independent observed preventive 
causes and an unobserved facilitating cause, 
although no experiment testing human judgement 
with more than one observed preventing cause 
seems to have been published. 
The situation is not symmetric. If there is an 
unobserved cause F, whose occurrence tends to 
prevent an independently occurring observed 
facilitating cause C from bringing about E, then the 
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causal power of C, q8,c , cannot be estimated from 
Pr(CAE) or from C interventions. 
In appropriate experimental situations, subjects 
should be uncertain of the power of a facilitating 
cause when they have reason to think a 
preventing cause is acting. 
If, however, there are two facilitating causes, C,O 
and an independent unobserved cause F which 
tends to prevent the influence of 0 on E but not 
the influence of C on E, then the causal power of 
C, but not 0, can be estimated. The equation is 
(11) E = qe,c C + [Qe,d 0 • (1-qe,f F)] 
and the derivation of Pr(qe,c) is the same as for (3) 
(see Cheng, 1997) but with the expression in 
brackets substituted for U. Subjects using Cheng 
models should have differential confidence in 
judgements of causal power when they know 
there is an unobserved preventing cause of one of 
two observed facilitating causes. 
VII. Answering Questions 4 and 5: 
Direct Versus Indirect Causal Power. 
A Cheng model with a OAG 
G 
with C facilitating, provides two distinct senses of 
the causal power of C: the direct causal power of 
C, which is Pr(E = 1 I C = 1, 0 = 0, G = 0, U = 0) = 
Pr(Qe,c) and the total causal power of C, which is 
Pr(E = 1 I C = 1, G = 0, U = 0). The total causal 
power of C is the probability that E occurs given 
that C occurs and that no other causes of E -
direct or indirect-occur unless they are effects of 
C. If 0 is facilitating as well, then it follows directly 
from the equations for the model that 
(12) Pr(E = 1 I C = 1, G = 0, U = 0) = Pr(Qe,c + qd,c 
Qe,d = 1). 
For any Cheng model in which all causes are 
facilitating, the total causal power of any variable, 
C, to influence any other, E-the probability that E 
= 1 given that C = 1 and that all causes of E that 
are not influenced by C have value 0-is the 
probability of the Boolean sum, over all directed 
paths from C to E, of the product of the q 
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coefficients associated with the edges in the path. 
The preceding examples afford a simple 
illustration of this rule, which is similar to the rule 
for computing influence in linear path models with 
standardized variables. For such Cheng models, 
the total causal power can be computed piecewise 
by computing Pr(Qa,b) for each edge B -> A in each 
directed path from C to E and using the 
independence of the q coefficients. But the total 
causal power can be computed more directly by 
using equation (3) with a probability distribution 
formed from Pr by conditioning on zero values for 
all observed causes of E that are not influenced 
by C. 
In appropriate contexts, and subject to processing 
limitations, subjects using Cheng models should 
give distinct judgements for total causal power and 
direct causal power, and should be able to judge 
the total causal power of any variable on any 
other. 
VIII. More on Question 4: Pathways 
with Both Facilitating and Preventing 
Causes 
If a cause C influences E only through a 
preventive direct cause F of E, which C facilitates, 
then C is not facilitating for E. Thus for the Cheng 
model. 
C ----+) F � E�(---H 
E = Qe,h H • ( 1 - Qe,r F) 
F=Qr.cC 
we have 
(13) E = Qe,h H • (1 - Qe,f Qf,c C) 
and the probability that E = 1 is obviously greater 
when C = 0 than when C = 1. The appropriate 
measure of the total causal power of C (to prevent 
E) is thus Pr(Qe,t Qt,c = 1). In such cases Cheng's 
formula (5) can be used to identify the total causal 
power of C. 
Subjects using Cheng models should judge that a 
cause that facilitates an intermediate cause that 
prevents an effect, prevents the effect. Subjects 
should be able to make · correct (qualitative) 
judgements about causal power in such 
circumstances. 
When a cause C has two or more pathways to an 
effect E, some pathways with a preventing direct 
cause of E and some with only facilitating causes, 
the cause always facilitates the effect. 
For example 
C �E 
F = qt,c C 
Hence 
(14) P( E = 1 I C = 0) = 0. P(E = 1 I C = 1) = 
Pr(Cqe,d (1 • Qe,c Qe,f Qr,c) = 1) > 0. 
If C is a facilitating cause of F, which is a 
preventing cause of 0, which is a facilitating cause 
of E, then C is a preventing cause of E, because 
D must have some other cause U, which facilitates 
D and hence E, but whose influence F reduces. 
For example: 
C -7 F ---)• D--+ E 
t 
I u I 
Qualitative reasoning suffices: the probability that 
F = 1 is greater given C = 1 than given C = 0. The 
probability that D = 1 is greater given F = 0 than 
given F = 1, and the probability that E = 1 is 
greater given that D = 1 than that D = 0, and the 
probabilities are independent. C has no causal 
power to produce E. 
The measure of causal power for a cause C that, 
by different pathways, both facilitates and 
prevents an effect E, is tricky. For example 
Because F is preventive, G must have some other 
cause, say H. The route from C to E through F 
tends to prevent E, while the direct connection 
facilitates E. The total causal power measured by 
the probability of E given that C =1 and all other 
causes of E that are not effects of E is simply 
P(qe,c). because we must condition on H = 0, 
which implies that G = 0. In general, a path with a 
preventing cause contributes to the total causal 
power only if the preventing cause is a parent of 
E. It would be interesting to know if human 
judgement is sensitive to these intricacies 
The outermost function of a Boolean expression 
for a Cheng model must be either a product or a 
sum. If a sum, a generalization of equation (3), 
conditioning on all observed causes E that are not 
effects of the candidate cause C, can be applied 
to compute the total causal power; if a product, 
then a generalization of equation (5). The direct, 
and the total causal power of any observed 
variable C with regard to any other observed 
variable E can be estimated from frequencies in 
any Cheng model, provided (i) no observed 
variable on any pathway from C to E is a 
deterministic function of any set of other such 
variables, and (ii) if D is a direct observed 
facilitating cause of observed cause G on a 
directed path from C to E, then G has no 
unobserved cause which prevents the influence of 
D. Where variables are related deterministically, 
parameters in Cheng models can still be 
estimated by interventions, provided condition (ii) 
applies. 
IX. Answering Questions 10 and 9: 
Cheng Models in Law and 
Epidemiology. 
The standard formula for predicting the proportion 
of injuries (E) that would be avoided if a risk factor 
(C) were eliminated from a population is the 
Population Attributable Fraction (PAF) (Finkelstein 
and Levin, 1990): 
(15) APe Prob(C) I Prob(E) 
Assuming only that C is independent of other 
causes of E and of the q parameters, Cheng's 
theory implies that the probability that C alone 
caused E, given that E occurs, equals PAF. Let 
U represent all other potential causes of E. Then 
in the Cheng model the frequency of units with E 
caused by C alone is 
(16) Prob(qec • C • (1 - qe,u • U) = 1) = 
Prob(C = 1)[Prob(qe,c = 1)- Prob(qec = 1)Prob(qeu 
• u = 1)] 
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The factor in square brackets is easily seen to 
equal APe. Dividing by Prob(E) yields PAF. 
The quantity relevant to legal disputes in which 
injury and exposure to a risk factor are stipulated 
is the probability that the risk factor alone caused 
the injury, conditional on occurrence of injury and 
exposure to the risk factor. The standard formula 
used (Finkelstein and Levin, 1990) is equivalent 
to: 
(17) APe Prob(C) I Prob(E,C) 
which follows immediately for Cheng models from 
the derivation of equation (15). 
To illustrate, consider the following data (from 
Finkelstein and Levin, 1990) comparing Leukemia 
deaths in children in Southern Utah with high and 
low exposure to radiation from fallout from nuclear 
tests in Nevada: 
Deaths 
Person 
years 
(in hundreds) 
High Low 
30 
6,913 
16 
5,901 
For Southern Utah the PAF is .245. The 
probability that leukemia death is caused by high 
exposure, given death and high exposure, is 
.3756. 
X. The Rest of Question 11: Cheng, 
Cartwright and Rubin Models. 
Cartwright ( 19??) advanced the two ideas, 
realized in Cheng models, that causal power is a 
feature of properties and is measured by the 
probability of the effect property when the causal 
property obtains and no other causal properties 
obtain. At least the first idea is implicit in most 
treatments of causation in the social sciences. 
Rubin, Holland and others have advanced a 
different representation of causal relations, 
according to which the locus of causal power is 
not in the properties but in the units, which differ in 
their disposition to elicit the effect property in 
response to the occurrence of the causal property. 
The difference is metaphysics, but not just 
metaphysics . A simple model in the Rubin­
Holland spirit is as follows: Every unit in the 
sample is one of four mutually exclusive kinds: 
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kind c: if exposed to C, then exhibits property 
E; otherwise does not exhibit E. 
kind u : if exposed to other causes U of E 
(besides C), then exhibits property E; 
otherwise does not exhibit E 
kind cu : exhibits E if exposed to C or to other 
causes of E 
kind n: does not exhibit E no matter what 
causes (C or U) it is exposed to. 
Let the frequencies of these kinds in the sample S 
be Prob(c); Prob(u); Prob(cu); Prob(n). We 
assume that these frequencies are all 
independent of C , which is also independent of U. 
It follows that: 
(18). Prob(E) = Prob(C)Prob(c) + Prob(U)Prob(u) 
+ Prob(U)Prob(cu) + Prob(C}Prob(cu} 
Prob(U)Prob(C}Prob(cu). 
Equations 15 and 17, and their interpretation, 
follow straightforwardly from equation 18 and its 
interpretation. Indeed, equations 15 and 17 follow 
if the "Rubin" model is extended to allow 
interaction by positing a fifth kind of unit that 
responds with E only when C and U are both 
present. The Cheng model allows a similar 
extension, under the assumption that C is 
independent of U and of the q parameters. The 
simple Cheng model (assuming only that C is 
independent of U and of the q parameters) and 
the simple Rubin model are related : 
(19) Prob(u) + Prob(cu) = Prob(qe,u) 
(20) Prob(c) + Prob(cu) = Prob(qe,c) 
Adding to the Cheng model the assumption that 
Qe,u and Qe,c are independent imposes a 
constraint that is not satisfied in the "Rubin" model 
unless: 
(21) Prob(u)Prob(c) = 
Prob(cu) 
1 - Prob(u) - Prob(c) - Prob(cu) 
In particular, if U is not observed, then the "causal 
power," Prob(E = 1 1 C = 1, U = 0), cannot be 
estimated in the "Rubin" model unless equation 21 
holds (and makes little sense in any case in the 
Rubin model). Cheng's results may indicate that 
human judgement of causation is better 
represented by Cartwright's than by Rubin's view 
of causation. 
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